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(Anti)Realist Implications of a Pragmatist
Dual-Process Active-Externalist
Theory of Experience
Tom Burke
University of South Carolina
Résumé : Les questions relatives à l’opposition réalisme/antiréalisme sont
abordées à la lumière d’une philosophie pragmatiste de l’esprit. On élabore une
philosophie pragmatiste de l’esprit dans les termes d’une théorie ‘externaliste-
active’ de l’expérience vue comme double processus. Cette théorie pose en
principe deux types d’expérience tels que la ‘mentalité’ (en tant que capacité
à penser, émettre des hypothèses, formuler des théories, raisonner, délibérer)
constitue l’un des deux types d’expérience. La correspondance formelle de la
théorie avec les faits est caractérisée en termes de correspondance fonctionnelle
entre ces deux types d’expérience. On discute alors les aspects réalistes et
constructivistes de cette conception. L’externalisme-actif garantit une sorte de
réalisme écologique, qui permet à la théorie d’éviter le constructivisme radical
ou l’irréalisme.
Abstract: Realism/antirealism issues are considered in light of a pragmatist
philosophy of mind. A pragmatist philosophy of mind is cast in terms of a
dual-process active-externalist theory of experience. This theory posits two
kinds of experience such that mentality (as a capacity for thinking, hypothe-
sizing, theorizing, reasoning, deliberating) constitutes one of the two kinds of
experience. The formal correspondence of theory with facts is characterized in
terms of a functional correspondence between these two kinds of experience.
Realist and constructivist aspects of this view are then discussed. Active-
externalism guarantees a kind of ecological realism that allows the theory to
avoid radical constructivism or irrealism.
The pragmatist philosophy of mind outlined in the first half of this
paper is designed to shed light on what William James and John Dewey
were concerned with a century ago in their wholesale rejection of tra-
ditional epistemology and metaphysics. What they took to be a viable
alternative, if comprehensible at all, may seem irrelevant if not entirely
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foreign to contemporary philosophy of mind. Nevertheless, contempo-
rary philosophy of mind at least in some quarters is beginning to echo
views proposed by James and Dewey.
These latter views, of course, have implications ranging beyond the
philosophy of mind as such. The second half of the present paper looks
at issues of realism and antirealism, discussing ways in which a prag-
matist theory of experience incorporates both constructivist and realist
tendencies and thus works toward resolving conflicts between hardcore
realism and equally hardcore antirealism.
In his introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism, Richard Rorty
makes the following interesting statement:
On the account of recent analytic philosophy which I offered in
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature [Rorty 1979], the history of
that movement has been marked by a gradual “pragmaticization”
of the original tenets of logical positivism. On the account of re-
cent “Continental” philosophy which I hope to offer in a book on
Heidegger which I am writing, James and Nietzsche make parallel
criticisms of nineteenth-century thought. Further, James’s version
is preferable, for it avoids the “metaphysical” elements in Nietzsche
which Heidegger criticizes, and, for that matter, the “metaphysi-
cal” elements in Heidegger which Derrida criticizes. On my view,
James and Dewey were not only waiting at the end of the dialec-
tical road which analytic philosophy traveled, but are waiting at
the end of the road which, for example, Foucault and Deleuze are
currently traveling. [Rorty 1982, xviii ]
What Rorty means by that last sentence is that James and Dewey man-
aged to do early on what analytic and “Continental” philosophy would
both eventually do, namely, “find a way of setting Philosophy to one
side” [xxi ] in favor of plain everyday “philosophy.” On this view “the
best hope for philosophy is not to practice Philosophy”—neither to give
in to the Platonic urge to “believe more truths or do more good or be
more rational by knowing more about Truth or Goodness or Rationality”
[xv ], nor to make Philosophy scientific, as the logical positivists hoped
for—but to adopt a naturalistic, behavioristic stance towards language,
knowledge, and related matters of common human interest [xxi ].
That may all be true; but Rorty’s last sentence above rings true in
another sense that he perhaps would not acknowledge. The naturaliza-
tion of philosophy has progressed at a brisk pace over the hundred-plus
years that pragmatism has been a going concern. Riding the wave of
Darwinism in the latter half of the nineteenth century and witnessing
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the rise of the new physics and its affects on epistemology at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, classical pragmatists also contributed not
only to the professionalization of philosophy in the U.S. but to the emer-
gence of psychology as a science distinct from philosophy or logic. Yet it
would seem that pragmatism disappeared from sight in the latter half of
the twentieth century just as we began to see momentous developments
in mathematics, statistics, logic, linguistics, and the sciences generally.
These latter developments supplied many of the basic tools, topics, and
issues of analytic philosophy, taking American philosophy in directions
that James and Dewey never imagined. Are they indeed waiting at the
end of that dialectical road?
Well, yes. Rorty’s characterization of analytic philosophy as eventu-
ally finding ways to set Philosophy aside does not easily accommodate
the fact that analytic philosophy in the twentieth century was as much
“technicalized” in particular ways as it was naturalized or “pragmati-
cized” in the course of assimilating methods from neighboring disciplines.
Such developments have not always been so much “in favor of everyday
‘philosophy’” as Rorty would have us believe. Pro-Philosophical twists
and turns in that technicalization easily explain why pragmatism largely
receded from view for much of the last half of the twentieth century, as if
analytical philosophy balked and refused to go where its dialectical trav-
els were taking it. Indeed, it is not often thought that James or Dewey
might have something to contribute to the more technical developments
that characterized this new dialectic. Nevertheless, where James and
Dewey are waiting lies in a direction allowing greater technicalization
but without a regressive Philosophy. By advocating substantive ideas
and methodologies better suited for a comprehensively naturalized phi-
losophy free from having to bear Philosophical loads, James and Dewey
anticipated much of where analytic philosophy should have headed much
earlier than it now seems to be heading.
In particular, Dewey developed conceptions of experience, learning,
inquiry, and intelligence that are supposed to hold up to scrutiny not
only in science or only in the classroom but generally in any phase or
aspect of human life. Minimally, recent work in the philosophy of mind
(despite previous detours) provides an interesting perspective on what
Dewey was attempting to do. Work in the cognitive sciences has matured
sufficiently in the last few decades so that certain recent developments
can with only minor modification be incorporated into Dewey’s theory
of experience without compromising either of the two in any significant
way. The benefits go both ways in that Dewey’s theory of experience
can positively contribute to these recent developments while the em-
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pirical and explanatory strength of the latter may help to render more
comprehensible the contrarian approach to epistemology and metaphys-
ics that James and Dewey were advocating.
1 A Pragmatist Philosophy of Mind
By pragmatist lights, a major obstacle to progress in the philosophy of
mind even to the present day is a faulty conception of the relation of
mind to the head and to the world outside the head. This is evident
in characterizations of the so-called “easy problems” of consciousness—
problems, for example, of explaining the role of intentional states in con-
trolling behavior, the reportability of mental states, the discrimination
and categorization of stimuli, the focus of attention, and so on (versus the
“hard problem” of accounting for the qualitative, phenomenal, subjective
what-it’s-like nature of experience). Allegedly, the “easy” problems can
be handled by neurobiology and computation theory [Chalmers 1995],
[Chalmers 2002]—as if cognitive science only (or primarily) needs to fig-
ure out how the computer inside the head works. The problem here is
neither with neurobiology nor with computation theory, of course, but
with the uncritical assumption that the relevant locus of computation
is exclusively inside the head. The “easy” problems thus are not being
solved precisely because proposed solutions are based on a neuro-centric
orientation to various basic distinctions—between mind and world, ideas
and things, theories and facts. This neuro-centric bias by itself is enough
to make the easy problems impossible to solve.
1.1 Folk Psychology and a Pragmatist Alternative
A generic though simplistic version of this way of thinking is depicted
in Figure 1. In this view, everything is essentially aligned with an in-
ner/outer brain/world distinction, including causal linkages going from
outer to inner and vice versa. In particular, experience (sensation, per-
ception) involves causal relations whereby the world impresses itself upon
the mind. Conversely, the action arrow depicts causal relations in the
opposite direction, often rationally mediated, whereby the external en-
vironment is manipulated according to the mind’s dictates.
Representation (a relation by which the mind and/or brain mirrors
the world as well as its own workings) and intentionality (a relation of
directedness toward an object, whether external or internal, real or un-
real) are often cited in explanations of the internal (ir)rational processes
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that mediate experience and action. There are many versions and refine-
ments of this basic perspective. So far, none of it works, as confirmed
by any recent philosophy-of-mind reader.
For what it is worth, we may contrast the foregoing folk perspective
with a pragmatist theory of experience. A preliminary formulaic claim
utilizing contemporary terminology goes as follows: a pragmatist theory
of experience = active externalism + a dual process theory of rationality
+ some additional tweaking.
It is assumed that what follows the “=” is known to the reader, though
a quick summary may be useful. On one hand, active externalism is
the view that the environment external to the brain and nervous sys-
tem plays an active role in constituting and driving cognitive processes
[Clark 1997], [Clark 2001], [Clark 2003], [Clark & Chalmers 1998], [Noë
2004], [Rockwell 2005]. This is a fairly radical refashioning of the se-
mantic externalism of [Putnam 1975] and [Burge 1979], embracing a
form of cognitive externalism and, respectively, a version of epistemic
externalism that does not presuppose cognitive internalism. Epistemic
externalism in particular relies on notions of epistemic deference con-
sistent with Burge’s conception of semantic deference or what Putnam
calls the linguistic division of labor. In this case knowledge encompasses
material artifacts [Baird 2004] and is socially distributed [Hardwig 1985],
[Hutchins 1995], [Longino 2006]. Granted, this version of epistemic ex-
ternalism is just the relatively uncontentious though nonstandard view
that an individual’s knowledge includes factors external to the individ-
ual’s head and brain without being external to the individual’s range
of possible experience, requiring no commitments either way concerning
what may be altogether beyond the individual’s ken.
‘‘INNER’’ / BRAIN / ORGANISM / THOUGHTS 
/ CONCEPTS / IDEAS
‘‘OUTER’’ / EXTERNAL WORLD / ENVIRONMENT / 
FACTS / KINDS / THINGS /…
ACTIONEXPERIENCE
Figure 1: mind vs world = brain vs environment?
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On the other hand, dual-process theories of rationality posit two com-
plimentary cognitive systems: (1) an evolutionarily older system that is
fast, associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, implicit, intuitive, in-
stinctive, compulsory, affective, impulsive, rigid, involuntary; versus (2)
a more recently evolved system that is slow, rule-based, controlled, con-
scious, serial, explicit, rational, reflective, deliberate, symbolic, verbal,
flexible, pliable [Frankish 2004], [Stanovich 1999], [Stanovich 2004].
We can combine these two views to obtain a pragmatist theory of ex-
perience if two other insights from James and Dewey are also included.
First, we have to reformulate the notion of experience not to embrace
traditional empiricism but, more interestingly, so that thinking (reason-
ing, reflecting, deliberating, theorizing) are cast as one of two kinds of
experience. In effect, this means that we should work primarily in terms
of a dual-process theory of experience, rather than of cognition or mind
or rationality.
Second, we need to peel various distinctions apart, introducing two
ninety-degree shifts in perspective. Specifically, (1) distinctions between
things and ideas, facts and theories, or perceiving and reasoning are to
be regarded as orthogonal to an inner/outer distinction, being aligned in-
stead with the two kinds of experience just mentioned (fast vs slow); and
(2) intentionality, contrary perhaps to what has been made of Brentano’s
original conception of it [Brentano 1874], is to be regarded primarily as a
kind of directedness towards maladjusted situations requiring resolution,
where the breakdown/resolution distinction is itself orthogonal to both
the inner/outer and the theory/fact distinctions. So, instead of aligning
everything in parallel with an inner/outer distinction as in Figure 1, we
would have an array of (at least) three independent (orthogonal) sets of
distinctions.
Detailed textual evidence will not be presented here; but the key ideas
outlined in the preceding paragraphs are present in William James’s Es-
says in Radical Empiricism [James 1912], The Meaning of Truth [James
1909], Principles of Psychology [James 1890], and elsewhere. Likewise,
these ideas can be found in John Dewey’s Essays in Experimental Logic
[Dewey 1916], Reconstruction in Philosophy [Dewey 1920], Experience
and Nature [Dewey 1925], The Quest for Certainty [Dewey 1929], and
elsewhere. These texts deserve careful scrutiny, particularly in light of
their contributions to the philosophy of mind. The point here is that
some important recent developments in the philosophy of mind are actu-
ally not so recent. Among the classical pragmatists, Dewey in particular
characterized an inner/outer distinction in objective biological and eco-
logical terms of organisms and their environments. Moreover, instead of
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associating thinking or reasoning exclusively with the organism, he pro-
posed (1) an ecological form of active externalism where experience is an
interactive temporal process taking place in arenas of organism/environ-
ment transactions, (2) a dual-process theory of experience where think-
ing/reasoning/deliberating are cast as one of two kinds of experience
(instinctual vs deliberate), and (3) a view that experiences (in a count
sense of the term; both fast and slow) are situated and episodic, directed
towards accomplishing resolutions of breakdowns.
In particular, Dewey’s distinction between primary and secondary ex-
perience in Experience and Nature [Dewey 1925, 15–17] is orthogonal to a
distinction between what is outside versus inside the head, though it par-
allels distinctions between things and ideas, facts and theory, perceiving
and reasoning. Meanwhile, the breakdown/resolution distinction that
characterizes the situated, episodic “intentional” nature of experiences is
Dewey’s generalized version of a doubt/belief conception of inquiry. On
this account, the breakdown/resolution distinction—orthogonal both to
an inner/outer distinction and to a primary/secondary distinction—is
part of a theory of experience such that inquiries make up a particu-
lar class of experiences, that is, such that inquiries are experiences. In
other words, one does not posit an independent conception of experi-
ence and only then address breakdown/resolution processes (for exam-
ple, problem-solving that sooner or later must “face the tribunal of sense
experience”) but rather the latter processes are constitutive of a proper
conception of experience to begin with.
On this view, intentionality is indeed what distinguishes us as living
creatures—that is, creatures capable of what Dewey calls psycho-physical
activity [Dewey 1925, 198]—though that notion has to be coupled with a
dual-process theory of experience to account for what distinguishes us as
thinking psycho-physical creatures “capable of that organized interaction
with other living creatures which is language, communication” [198].
These distinctions are depicted in Figures 2 and 3. In contrast with
Figure 1, Figure 2 depicts a distinction between two kinds of experi-
ence that is orthogonal to an inner/outer distinction. As Dewey ex-
plains it, primary experience is a kind of organism/environment interac-
tion that is instinctive and habitual—yielding “gross, macroscopic, crude
subject-matters” that constitute apparent things and facts as they are
directly encountered. Primary experience furnishes brute data for sec-
ondary experience. Conversely, secondary experience is a kind of organ-
ism/environment interaction that is reflective, deliberate, speculative—
utilizing ideas, hypotheses, theories, and the like in efforts to explain and
regulate the ongoing course of primary experience.
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This distinction between facts and theories (and thus between pri-
mary and secondary experience), again, is orthogonal to one between
an environment (outer) and an organism (inner). Nevertheless the dis-
tinction between primary and secondary experience is the basis for an
account of representation in the sense that theories represent facts. Con-
sequently, issues concerning truth and the like would have more to do
with correspondences between two kinds of organism/environment inter-
action (both of which are equally accessible) and not so much between
an inner mind and an outer world (each by itself being mysterious and
essentially inaccessible by all current accounts).
Figure 3 depicts a second ninety-degree shift away from a simple
inner/outer distinction, pertaining in this case to the directedness of
experiences (in the count sense of the term). The breakdown/resolution
distinction that determines the direction of an experience is thus or-
thogonal to each of the former two distinctions. (View Figure 3 as being
rotated ninety degrees into and out of the page from Figure 2.)
Intentionality (at least as immediately occurrent directedness toward
an inexistent object; not in every sense of aboutness, e.g., in the sense
that representations of facts are about facts) may be identified with
this directedness of experience with regard to a maladjusted situation
in need of resolution—such that the ongoing course of experience tends
to be both situated and episodic in nature, always involving primary
experience (driven by instinctual, habitual responses to discordant cir-
cumstances) and often involving secondary experience (proceeding as
deliberate reflective regulative inquiry) in various efforts to regain some
kind of equilibrium in organism/environment transactions.
Putting all of this together, we obtain the following revised formulaic
‘‘INNER’’ / BRAIN / ORGANISM
‘‘OUTER’’ / EXTERNAL WORLD / ENVIRONMENT
PRIMARY EXPERIENCE SECONDARY EXPERIENCE
Figure 2: one 90◦ shift: primary vs secondary experience.
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claim: a pragmatist theory of experience = active externalism + a dual-
process theory of primary versus secondary experience + an account of
experiences as situated, episodic equilibrations + an arrangement of these
three independent factors into a multi-dimensional epistemological and
psychological framework.
1.2 Two Challenges
The latter formula does not say as much as we should want, though it
works against folk-psychological intuitions if it works at all. There are, of
course, two obvious questions about active externalism in particular—
two challenges—that highlight what is at issue here: (I) How exactly
are worldly objects or facts inner as well as outer? (II) How exactly are
thoughts or theories outer as well as inner? How would a pragmatist
answer these questions?
There are two complimentary ways to reply to these questions (not
that the present paper will pursue either way in any detail). On one
hand, we might look to philosophy. On the other hand, we might try
to do some cognitive science. In the first case, besides the works of
James and Dewey, we could recite numerous well-known arguments and
examples from the philosophical literature in favor of various kinds of
externalism. This kind of reply should give at least some plausibility to
a pragmatist theory of experience.
Question (I) is thus answerable by arguing for a kind of operational
externalism. Namely, by virtue of the interactive coupling of organisms
and their environments, primary experience is operationally projective
and perspectival [Hanson 1958], [McDowell 1994], [Noë 2004], [Wittgen-
INNER, ETC
OUTER, ETC
‘‘INTENTIONALITY ’’
B
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Figure 3: another 90◦ shift: breakdown and resolution.
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stein 1953]. This is not to claim that perception or perceptual facts are
“theory-laden.” That is a different point that is specific to perceivers
capable of entertaining “theories” whereas the present point is intended
to cover all perceivers in general. The present point pertains not to theo-
retical but to operational perspectivity. The point is that primary expe-
rience is laden by operational capabilities, and these capabilities depend
as much on the organism’s constitution as on environmental conditions
under which they are implemented. For instance, perceptual illusions
clearly exemplify ways in which our perceptions are geared (beyond our
deliberate control) to the workings of our sensory machinery, not solely
to how and what things are independently of our perceiving them. Thus:
outer objects are also inner in the sense that their direct presentation
in primary experience is a function of the organism as much as of the
environment.
Question (II) can be addressed using concepts and arguments asso-
ciated with semantic externalism [Putnam 1975], [Burge 1979], [Lunt-
ley 1999], cognitive externalism [Clark & Chalmers 1998], [Clark 1997],
[Clark 2001], [Noë 2004], [Rockwell 2005], and epistemic externalism
[Baird 2004], [Hardwig 1985], [Hutchins 1995], [Longino 2006]. These
arguments will not be recounted here, but their cumulative upshot is
that the supervenience base of secondary experience is extended into the
world beyond brains or body surfaces. This larger supervenience base
includes spatio-physical structures particularly as they are involved in
the technological, cultural-linguistic, and social-institutional complexes
in which those brains and bodies are embedded. Thus: inner thoughts
are also outer in the sense that their direct occurrence in secondary
experience is a function of the environment as much as of the organism.
On the other hand, one should also respond to questions (I) and (II)
by trying to do some cognitive science. The aim in this case is to build
and test working models to try to fathom how far one can run with such
ideas. Primary and secondary experience will call for different kinds
of modeling techniques that nevertheless must be mutually compatible
and subject to some kind of synthesis. A number of existing research
programs and modeling techniques may be useful here, though we will
only speculate about such prospects.
In response to question (I): it is not unreasonable to think that pri-
mary experience may be modeled (i) using subsumption architectures
[Brooks 1990]; (ii) using artificial-life simulations, genetic algorithms,
“constrained generating procedures,” and complexity science [Beer &
Gallagher 1992], [Clark 1997], [Holland 1998]; more generally, (iii) by
way of dynamical systems theory, including but not limited to neural
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network or connectionist models [Port & van Gelder 1995], [Clark 1997];
or more specifically (iv) drawing on conceptual and methodological as-
pects of ecological psychology [Gibson 1979], [Heft 2001]. Regardless of
how we might employ any of these modeling strategies, the challenge in
all such efforts is to model perception and object-recognition processes
that are fast, robust, and reliable.
In particular, if we take the ecological active-externalism premise se-
riously, we can only base an account of primary experience on the idea
of elementary ecological interactions of some sort. Ecological psychol-
ogy suggests that we start with a primitive notion of active invariant-
extraction or invariant-detection as this elementary form of organism/en-
vironment interaction. We could construct a generic notion of a program
from that of invariant-extraction (that is, an atomic program in this
setting would be the implementation of a given invariant-extraction ca-
pability so as to extract a specific invariant, or a specific instance of an
invariant, as it were—not unlike an assignment of a value to a variable,
though not exactly like it either). We are then able to utilize a respective
multi-modal dynamic logic to model “computational” features of primary
experience [Burke 2002]. Perceivable objects (or kinds of perceivable ob-
jects, more precisely) would have to be cast in terms of frames or models
defined over such logics, thus providing one way to capture the Gibson-
ian idea that objects are essentially systemic bundles of affordances. The
fact that the details of such models would be ecological in nature “all the
way down” (and all the way up, for that matter) would explain how it
is that any perceived object is as much a function of the organism as of
the environment and hence is as much inner as it is outer.
In response to question (II): it is reasonable to speculate that mod-
eling secondary experience would focus especially on the role of lan-
guages and cultures in human experience, these being the media of slow
and deliberate experience. This emphasis would have to include social-
institutional structures (economic, political, etc.) as external sources of
constraints on individual rational choice [Clark 1997, chap. 9–10], [Satz
& Ferejohn 1994].
More generally, this modeling task calls for a thorough reconsider-
ation of the nature and role of language in human experience. It will
almost certainly require (i) that we rethink semantics. For example, set
theory is not a good place to begin insofar as “objects” are real enough
but are neither fundamental, elementary, nor primitive, no matter that
they may be as real as anything is real. But if set theory is suspect,
so are traditional (Tarski-style) approaches to semantics, particularly as
the latter are geared to formal languages that (if only intuitively) regard
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nameable objects as ontologically fundamental. The question then is
how to proceed if we instead take invariant-detection capabilities to be
fundamental and proceed as above with a constructed notion of objects
and kinds of objects. One cannot simply do business as usual so far as
formal semantics goes. Focusing on language and culture in models of
secondary experience similarly requires (ii) that we seriously rethink log-
ical syntax. If “objects” are not fundamental, then we should not blindly
adhere to a logical syntax that takes them to be so.
It is also necessary (iii) to rethink pragmatics—for example, to re-
construct relevance theory [Sperber & Wilson 1995], first, by dispens-
ing with Fodor’s computational theory of mind and opting instead for
a pragmatist view informed by Mead’s social psychology [Burke 2005]
and, second, by supplementing the idea of relevance with one of utility
so as to accommodate the intentional breakdown/resolution dimension
of experience [Burke ms].
Otherwise, on other fronts, (iv) Lakoff and Núñez [Lakoff & Núñez
2000] may help to explain how the present framework can accommodate
mathematical cognition, where mathematical ideas are constituted by
way of metaphor though they are grounded in bodily activities and thus
rooted in primary experience. What is particularly significant about
their conception of the role of metaphor in the growth and development
of mathematical cognition is that it may help to explain the distinction
and connection between primary and secondary experience in general,
namely, not as mirroring but as a layering of schematic metaphors, con-
stituting a coupling and/or clutch mechanism of sorts (see below).
Also, (v) we might employ models of bounded rationality that focus
specifically on “fast and frugal heuristics” [Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC
Research Group 1999], [Gigerenzer & Selten 2001], [Clark 1997]. Some
of the work being done along these lines may be pertinent to modeling
primary experience directly (for example, catching a fly ball on the run)
while other work seems to deal with fast but deliberate choices (for
example, choosing which of two or more gambles one is willing to take).
In any case, (vi) all such modeling has to be informed by evolu-
tionary accounts of the emergence not just of symbol-use but of full-
fledged compositional languages capable of handling sentences, propo-
sitions, concepts, and the like in secondary experience—as opposed to
creatures’ dealing directly with things, kinds, facts, and so on in primary
experience [Burke 2002], [Burke 2005].
To summarize: We do not have to look far to find existing modeling
techniques that may be used to fill out a pragmatist theory of experience.
The one key idea is to take the ecological interactional premise seriously
and begin with a primitive notion of active invariant-detection. On that
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basis we may attempt to apply various modeling strategies so as to clarify
and render testable the pragmatist theory of experience outlined above.
2 (Anti)Realism?
The preceding discussion is only a preliminary survey of strategies one
may use to model and test a pragmatist theory of experience. But clearly
a lot of work can be done to try to (in)validate that theory. The remain-
ing half of the present paper deals with the less ambitious task of ex-
amining realist and antirealist features and commitments of this theory.
Historically, a major impetus for a pragmatist theory of experience has
been the felt need to avoid long-standing conundrums associated with
an apparent chasm between mind and world as envisaged by folk psy-
chology. The pragmatist remedy to these conundrums is the use of a
strategy by which both facts and theories straddle that apparent chasm.
A defense of such a view must answer allegations that it inevitably leads
to idealism, subjectivism, solipsism, or other dire consequences of radical
constructivism.
We can approach these issues by way of the notion of representa-
tion. Representation is of course a key factor in the operations of human
mentality; but it is not at all obvious how best to characterize the rep-
resentation relation. The relevant distinction in the present view is one
not between brain versus external world but between secondary versus
primary experience. In the present framework, the latter distinction is
the best if not only way to talk about mind representing the world, or
about thoughts representing facts.
Several points can be made straightaway about the nature of rep-
resentation if we cast it as a relation between secondary and primary
experience. This view suggests that representation is not essentially a
mirroring relation, and it is something other than the adaptation of
neural systems to environmental conditions. Instead, representation in-
volves operational correspondences or couplings between two kinds of
organism/environment interactions and thus between two kinds of adap-
tations of neural systems to environmental conditions. As opposed to
inner representations mirroring the outer world, the important relation
here is a functional, operational coupling of fast and slow interactive
processes. In this view, secondary experience requires the equivalent of
a “clutch mechanism” as part of this coupling, making it possible for one
to disengage from instinctive, habitual transactions with the world and
otherwise to slow things down (when possible) in response to trouble-
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some circumstances where we may need to switch gears (as it were) and
redirect ongoing activities.
How to account for this disengagement capability as a feature of sec-
ondary experience (and thus as characteristic of representation) is not
straightforward, but it has already been suggested above that one ap-
proach might be to generalize the conception of metaphorical correspond-
ence that Lakoff and Núñez have used to account for the growth and
development of mathematical cognition. For example, at least 43,000
years ago humans developed systems of gift-exchange perhaps as a form
of favor-tracking or to serve as an external “memory” of kinship relations
or other forms of reciprocal altruism. It is thought that such giving orig-
inally may have worked as a kind of insurance or social security among
groups with limited, precarious, specialized resources, as with present
day !Kung San hunter-gatherer groups in Botswana. The point is that
the giving or sharing of ostrich-eggshell jewelry, for instance, is a repre-
sentation of the giving or sharing of life-sustaining resources in the sense
that (1) the giving of jewelry corresponds metaphorically to the giving of
life-sustaining resources and (2) the giving of jewelry, as a hedge against
hard times, is more or less abstract and symbolic in the sense that it
pertains to possible givings of valuable food or water in different not-yet-
existent circumstances. Jewelry does not exactly mirror food and water,
and the giving of jewelry does not exactly mirror the giving of food or
water; but schematic metaphorical correspondences in such instances in
the way that Lakoff and others characterize such correspondences are
not difficult to imagine [Lakoff & Núñez 2000], [Lakoff & Johnson 1980].
The question, of course, is whether (iterations of) this kind of analysis
can serve as the basis for a full many-layered account of representation.
In any case, the claim here is that secondary experience as such allows
us to stop and think (or at least to coast and think) about what is hap-
pening in given circumstances and how best to react—versus acting on
mere impulse alone. A pragmatist theory of experience thus distinguishes
facts versus theories, things and ideas, and so forth, so as to incorpo-
rate these distinctions into a single conception of experience consisting of
an operational coupling of two kinds of experience: fast-and-instinctive
versus slow-and-deliberate. A key point here is that representations con-
stitute the warp and woof of slow-and-deliberate secondary experience
and thus are not essential as such to fast-and-instinctive primary experi-
ence. Representations bear on primary experience only in the sense that
features of the latter are “represented” in secondary experience (what-
ever that may mean) such that the latter may influence the course of
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primary experience.
Obviously, this account construes the representation relation as being
orthogonal to an organism/environment distinction. It is instructive to
contrast this view with Quine’s holism [Quine 1951]. Specifically, Quine’s
brand of holism fails to accommodate a perspective whereby various epis-
temological distinctions are orthogonal to a physical-spatial inner/outer
distinction. The central and peripheral parts of a Quinean “web of belief”
correlate exactly with what is inside versus outside the brain, with expe-
rience being characterized in terms of irritations of nerve endings at the
interface between the two [Quine 1960], [Quine 1981]. Quine’s metaphors
involving webs of belief and man-made fabrics of science clearly illustrate
a common problem with many treatments of realism/antirealism issues,
whether one espouses metaphysical realism, scientific realism, epistemo-
logical constructivism, conventionalism, irrealism, or what have you. It
is the problem, again, of uncritically assuming a folk-psychological per-
spective that (1) positions mind, ideas, theories, beliefs, and the like
inside the head, (2) places the world, things, facts, reality, and such
outside the head, and (3) casts experience as some kind of flow of in-
formation from the latter to the former by way of various orifices and
membranes at the head’s and/or body’s extremities.
Alternatively, a pragmatist theory of experience explicitly rejects the
latter folk-psychological perspective and therefore lies nowhere in the
standard spectrum of positions one may take on realism/antirealism is-
sues. Nevertheless it bears some kind of relation both to metaphysical
realism and to radical constructivism given that it attempts to accom-
modate what is right in either extreme view while avoiding the pitfalls
of a schizoid folk psychology. We would want to say that a pragma-
tist theory of experience is in some sense both constructivist and realist
rather than neither, though it is neither if one insists that realism and
constructivism are absolutely and irrevocably inconsistent with one an-
other. The positive claim that a pragmatist theory of experience is both
constructivist and realist is, of course, the more interesting of the two
positions one might take in this regard.
2.1 Constructivism
Constructivist aspects of a pragmatist theory of experience are fairly ob-
vious consequences of the fact that it is a dual-process theory of primary
and secondary experience that turns the fact/theory distinction nine-
ty degrees sideways so as to be orthogonal to a biophysical inner/outer
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distinction. In this view, to check theories against facts (ideas against
things, mind against the world) is to check one (slow) kind of experience
against another (fast) kind of experience. Thus, on one hand, things
and facts are involuntary upshots of primary experience, whereas ideas
and theories are products of a different (secondary) kind of experience—
requiring more recently evolved experiential capabilities that are rule-
based, controlled, and deliberate.
Again, the notion that facts are “theory-laden” is not the crucial
point here. Rather, we should first note that facts and objects in them-
selves are necessarily constituted in part by the automatic, instinctive,
impulsive ways in which we access the world. That facts (as products of
primary experience) are practice-laden is the fundamental sense in which
a pragmatist theory of experience leans toward constructivism.
Notice, nevertheless, that facts (things, realities) are indeed brute
facts (things, realities), being what they are independently of what we
may think them to be, even if they would not be independent of our
modes of primary experience. This is a rather weak form of constructiv-
ism that is not unpalatable if one can appreciate the robustness of the
epistemic objectivity that it allows.
The different issue of how and whether hypotheses and theories (as
features of secondary experience) bear on the reality or non-reality of
the entities they make claims about, whether observable by “unaided”
perceptual capabilities (e.g., rocks) or not (e.g., electrons), is a recurrent
practical issue that nevertheless should not present particularly deep
philosophical mysteries. There is after all not a huge difference in prin-
ciple between rocks and electrons insofar as instances of either of these
kinds of things are present to our perceptual systems only as they are
filtered through perceptual activities. We might try to peer behind this
veil of practices into an alleged bare reality of things, but we would then
lose any grasp of what a given thing may be as a real object insofar
as it has any accessible bearing on us. It is as if the sensible effects of
perceptual practices constitute a veil in which reality is shrouded but
such that what is behind the veil immediately evaporates in the very
act of lifting that veil. For a pragmatist theory of experience, if sensible
effects of preceptual practices indeed constitute a veil, then attending
to the fabric and flux of this veil in reactive contact with the world is
precisely how we discern the contours of reality. This veil is not to be
lifted but rather pressed, prodded, and molded against anything that
offers resistance, whether the results be rocks, electrons, or whatever.
Of course, quite a bit more theory accompanies experiences of elec-
trons than that of rocks, for most of us, which is to say that our ex-
(Anti)Realist Implications. . . 203
periences of electrons are considerably more theory-laden than are our
experiences of rocks. The fact that this difference is so pronounced may
seem to support a kind of instrumentalism which holds that electrons
“exist” only to the extent that they work within this or that theory of
physics or chemistry (and that is all that need be said about their onto-
logical status). But this ignores the fact that the last one hundred years
of science and technology has rendered their sensible effects so familiar
in primary experience—so that they “work” concretely within primary
experience, not just formally within this or that theory—that we regard
electrons as somehow real independently of any particular theory or even
independently of admitting that our current theories are probably inad-
equate. Ultimately we may be wrong in thinking them to be real in this
way (as happened, for instance, with “celestial spheres”); but for now
there is no point in insisting that they are only useful fictions—just as
there would be no point in saying such a thing about rocks.
2.2 Realism
To question whether a pragmatist theory of experience is realist or not
presupposes some prior effort to clarify what is meant by “realism” in
the first place. In particular, the style of realism that is compatible with
a pragmatist theory of experience is significantly constrained by the fact
that an active-externalist ninety-degree-shifted dual-process theory of
experience cannot reasonably regard “things” or “objects” as primitive
denizens of an external universe. The idea of a “thing-in-itself” indepen-
dent of primary experience is vaguely meaningful but largely useless here.
Likewise, the question-begging practice of taking domains of first-order
quantification to be domains of things (with the full-fledged ontological
commitments this is supposed to entail) is especially questionable—in
which case the entire edifice of mathematical logic in its present form
becomes suspect.
A pragmatist theory of experience and its consequent style of realism
have to be formulated and otherwise grounded in some other way. The
way to do it, again, is to take seriously the active-externalist assumption,
literally, that neither primary nor secondary experience can be located
exclusively inside or outside the head. Each kind of experience occurs
rather in a field of inner/outer (organism/environment) interactions, the
point being that any primitive elements to which we might appeal in
psychological modeling must be elementary modes of such interaction.
Anything else will almost certainly slippery-slide us back into some form
of folk psychology.
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As outlined earlier, “objects” or “things” in this view are easily accom-
modated as instances of kinds. Kinds, in turn, may be cast as (classes
of) models of multi-modal dynamic logics based on the notion of ele-
mentary programs as implementations of invariant-detection abilities.
There are, of course, “easy” problems of primary experience as well as
the “hard” what-it’s-like problem of primary experience, and this way of
computationally modeling primary experience only addresses the easy
problems. But this theory is clearly not idealist or otherwise radically
anti-realist insofar as (1) the constitution of “kinds” depends on regu-
larities in the external world as much as on established abilities of the
organism, where (2) neither of these two factors depends in any essential
way on how or what the experiencer does or might think. The notion
that facts are necessarily constituted in part by the world that we often
access in automatic and yet reliable ways is the fundamental sense in
which a pragmatist theory of experience is realist.
Further details are hard to summarize, especially since they have yet
to be worked out to any acceptable degree. But if elementary modes of
interaction are indeed where we should ground a pragmatist theory of
experience, any elaboration of details would have to include a number of
things that have already been mentioned or else are clear consequences
of what has been discussed so far.
In particular, state-of-the-art physics and biology, on their own terms,
will always set the stage informally (or meta-theoretically) for how we
distinguish organisms versus environments and thus how we characterize
so-called active externalism. Of course, this stage-setting will always be
tentative. Fortunately there are bodies of physical and biological facts
and concepts (that the earth is more or less spherical, that the gravita-
tional constant at place X is such and so, etc.) that, regardless of the
fate of various cutting-edge developments, will pretty much remain in-
tact and thus provide a stable vocabulary for talking about what is inside
and outside of brains and heads, at least in physical and/or biological
terms. Be that as it may, the cognitive sciences do not fall squarely
within the purview of physics and/or biology. We are thus going be-
yond mere physics or biology when we draw on ecological psychology as
a way of modeling primary experience. In particular, elementary modes
of interaction and thus primitive features of primary experience would
be characterized generically as abilities to extract or detect invariant in-
formation in the midst of ambient fluxes of activity; and each instance of
such detection has an elusive what-it’s-like quality that escapes merely
physical or biological explanation. In this basic sense, it is fairly clear
that we are already assuming something like a live creature as an agent
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capable of having experiences in which qualitative invariant-detection
plays a fundamental role.
We have also seen, at least briefly, how to give an account of things
or objects in primary experience as instances of ecological systems of
affordances. Of courses, affordances are always affordances for one or
another live creature. Any manner of modeling primary and secondary
experience, to be successful, must be able to make sense of this notion of
affordances, especially if the latter is the key to making sense of objects
and kinds of objects. The claim here is not that things or objects do not
actually exist but only that they are not suitable as psychological (or
logical/semantic) primitives when regarded as being wholly independent
of any particular perceiving agent. An object or substance that we regard
as debris may be perceived as nutriment by some other creature. That
one-and-the-same stuff, if it is real at all, is fully real. But what it is
real as depends essentially on who is perceiving it. At the same time,
the fact that it is compost material to a given human being and the fact
that it is food to a given earthworm are two equally factual facts. For
this reason alone, a pragmatist theory of experience does not easily lend
itself to nominalism insofar as there are no objects to speak of except as
instances of kinds; and there are no kinds, for that matter, except with
respect to this or that live creature.
It may help to compare this affordance-based notion of facticity with
the formal-semantical notion that sentences are not simply true or false
absolutely but are only true-in-a-model or false-in-a-model. This rela-
tivization of truth to models in no way weakens the notion of truth but
only clarifies what it means to say that a claim is true. The idea of
relativizing object-hood and kind-hood to specific living organism/envi-
ronment systems is a more complicated idea in need of substantial clari-
fication; but it is designed not to compromise the notions of actuality or
facticity but to clarify what it means to say that a given object actually
exists or that a given possible fact is indeed an actual fact. That is what
the notion of affordances is all about.
We should also keep in mind as well that the preceding discussion is to
be couched within a theory of experience that accommodates the situated
nature of experiences as episodes of resolution of breakdowns. Objects
occur as instances of this or that kind only as they might occur in such
situations, or so the theory goes. Something worth noting here is the fact
that such situations are not locatable anywhere except within fields of
interactions that constitute living organism/environment systems. Situ-
ations initially are breakdowns or maladjustments in such interactions.
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It is only in that sense that they are “parts of the world.” Nevertheless
they are indeed parts of the world, not just subjective states.
The bottom line is that a pragmatist theory of experience is realistic
in the sense of Gibsonian ecological psychology—not so much with regard
to individuals or universals in any traditional sense, but with regard to
ambient fields of organism/environment interactions and to engrained
abilities of respective live creatures to detect invariants in the flux of
those interactions and thereby to perceive things as systemic bundles
of affordances. Such things are indeed as real as anything gets. But
realism/antirealism issues have been recast in such a way that invariant-
extraction abilities are what a pragmatist theory of experience may take
to be fundamental and thus what it may take to be fundamentally real.
Perhaps the more important point is not just that we can attribute reality
to what we take to be fundamental but rather that a pragmatist theory
of experience calls for different commitments as to what we should take
to be fundamental.
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